Public sector reform programs implemented across Africa, including the World Bank's "first" and 'second" generation reforms, are based on the assumption that all public organizations are inefficient. This problematic assumption has had significant implications for policy in Africa. By failing to recognize that not all public organizations perform poorly, we ignore any potential lessons that could have been learnt from the experiences of organizations that have managed to perform effectively under the same social, political, economic and institutional environment. This paper uses Ghana as a case study to examine whether there are significant differences in the characteristics of poor and good performing public organizations. We found that good and poor performing organizations in Ghana were significantly different in two respects: remuneration and hiring criteria.
Introduction
The importance of a well-functioning public sector in Africa's development process is indisputable. The challenge however is finding ways to create effective public sector organizations capable of facilitating national development. Indeed, many African countries, with the support of the World Bank and other pro-reform international institutions have since the 1980s experimented with various public sector reform strategies. These policies include the World Bank's "first-and the secondgeneration" public sector reform programs. The first generation reforms were introduced in the 1980s and focused on reducing the explosive public-sector wage bill. They, however, led to the erosion of publicsector wages vis-à-vis the private sector, and many skilled workers left public employment. The second generation reforms were introduced in the 1990s to improve the quality of the public sector, but these too have so far produced disappointing results in many African countries. 1
The first and second generation policies have two important flaws. First, the underlying assumption of the policies is that all public organizations are ineffective. Clearly, this assumption is flawed because within each country there are public organizations that perform relatively well, given the constraints that they face (Grindle, 1997; Owusu 2005) . Second, policies were applied across the board -i.e., a one-size-fits-all solutions -and therefore did not take into consideration the country-specific conditions under which organizations operate. Note that by failing to consider any possible differences in the performance of organizations within countries or even acknowledge the possibility of the existence of good and poor performers within countries; the policies ignored any potentially valuable lessons that could have been learned from the well-performing public organizations in the same social, political and economic environment. Moreover, because the policies are not based on experiences of organizations in the country, they are often seen by management as outside impositions (Tsikata, 2003) and the performance standards as utopian expectations that could never be achieved in their specific organizations given the constraints they face. As a result, public-sector reform policies generally have been implemented by officials with a lukewarm attitude. Indeed, policies based on the experiences of organizations within a country are more likely to be seen as realistic and have a greater chance of adoption than those derived from organizations in different countries.
Surprisingly, studies on the differential performance of public organizations within the same countries are scant (Grindle, 1997; Owusu 2005) . Rather, research in this area has generally focused on explaining the poor performance of public organizations. This paper contributes to the search for an effective public-sector reform strategy by using Ghana as a case study to examine whether there are significant differences in the characteristics of poor and good performing public organizations. The topic is timely for Ghana and Africa as a whole because of the renewed sense of urgency for creating an effective public sector at both the continental level and at the national level in many countries, including ways of creating effective and efficient public sector reform strategy. Thus, our paper will provide some guidance to policymakers as they grapple with restructuring the public sector.
The analysis in the paper are based on data collected in Ghana, between June and August 2003, that documented the characteristics of selected public sector organizations (see Section 3 for details).
Using this data, we examined whether there were significant differences between the attributes of good and poor performing organizations. We found that the two types of organizations were different in two respects: remuneration and hiring criteria. Specifically, we found that good performing institutions paid 2 NEPAD is a development framework put together by African leaders to eradicate poverty and promote growth in the region (see Owusu, 2003) higher salaries. Furthermore, employees of bad performing institutions are more likely to be hired based on their personal connections than qualifications.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses public sector reforms in Ghana. Section 3 describes the data collection process, the classification method, the variables and the empirical results and Section 4 concludes.
Public Sector Reforms in Ghana -A Brief Review
Similar to many African countries that experienced economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, the public sector in Ghana was in complete disarray by the mid-1980s. A combination of devaluation and inflation led to a significant decline in real salaries between 1960 and the late 1980s. For example, the minimum wage that has been falling since the 1960s, reached its lowest level in 1983, and although real wages improved between 1986 and 1989, even at its peak in 1989, it was only 42% of the level in 1960 (Owusu, 2001) . Public sector employees were not exempted from this precipitous decline in wages.
Between 1976 and 1984, public-sector real wages in Ghana declined by 73 percent for unskilled labor and 93 percent for skilled labor. Moreover salaries were not only inadequate, but payment was also erratic. To make matters worse, most offices, especially those outside the capital city, Accra, were dilapidated and lacked the basic necessities of a functioning office such as paper, pencils, telephones, light bulbs, etc.
Employees became demoralized; effectiveness and productivity concerns were relegated to the background as work effort declined, absenteeism and moonlighting increased, and corruption, political hiring, and rent-seeking became widespread (Owusu, 2005) . These conditions made it extremely difficult to recruit and retain technical and professional staff. Gradually the bloated public sector became increasingly incapable of performing basic tasks, let alone to facilitate national development efforts. The ineffectiveness of the public sector became a serious hindrance when the government embarked on economic reforms in 1983. 3 As a result, the government was compelled to initiate public sector reforms to support the implementation of the economic policies.
A brief background of the World Bank's public sector reform policies recommended for African countries is necessary for understanding the Ghana government policies because of the striking similarity between them. World Bank public sector reform policies can be classified into two: the "quantitative"
first-generation, and the "qualitative" second-generation reform programs. 4 The first-generation reforms were implemented between the 1980s and early 1990s, and were part of the structural adjustment policies implemented by the Bank in several African countries. The aim of the first-generation reforms was to trim the size of the government and the policies implemented included retrenchment, cost-recovery and privatization (Lienert and Modi, 1997) . Although these policies helped reduce government wage bills in some cases, overall, they failed to improve the performance of the public sector. One reason for the ineffectiveness of the policies was the narrow focus of the reforms (Numberg, 1999) . The second generation reforms began in the 1990s. This time, the policies focused on improving the quality of publicsector employment and to make it more attractive (World Bank, 2001) . Specifically, remuneration and promotion policies were used to reward performance; measures were put in place to improve management and accountability; and employees were provided with incentives, skills and motivation. The second generation reform policies also did not produce the desired results.
Versions of the Bank's policies have been implemented by the Ghanaian government. The country's first comprehensive public sector reform program was the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP -1987 (CSRP - -1994 . Coinciding with the era of the "quantitative" first-generation reforms, the CSRP aimed to reduce overstaffing and trim redundant civil servants as a part of the effort to reduce government expenditure and help achieve macroeconomic stability. The program successfully reduced the number of civil servants in central government from about 140,000 in 1987 to 90,000 in 1994 (Leita, 1999) . Despite this success, the overall effect of the program in terms of efficiency gains was mixed, partly because of its narrow focus and the lack of government commitment.
In 1994, the government changed the focus of public sector reforms with the creation of the might resemble the World Bank's "service delivery" third-generation reforms now in vogue. Thus, this article is timely and its policy recommendations will contribute significantly to this on-going search.
Description of the Data, Variables and Results

The Data
The paper is part of a larger project designed to document the experiences of good and poor performing public organizations in Ghana (Owusu, 2004) . The data was collected between June and August 2003. Assessing the performance of public organizations is a difficult for several reasons. Unlike private organizations where profits are often used as a measure of performance, there is no single performance indicator that can compare the different types of organizations that make up the public sector (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999) . Moreover, as Manning, Mukherjee, and Gokcekus (2000:9) argue, publicsector organizations often provide goods of both "low contestability and measurability," and therefore it is impossible to find good performance measures. Measuring the performance of public organizations in Ghana was particularly difficult due to the lack of access to data that would ordinarily be publicly available in other countries.
To overcome these challenges, the reputational method was used for selecting the organizations to study and for measuring their performance. 7 First, a list of 47 public organizations was compiled.
Second, we also compiled a list of 23 "knowledgeables"-persons who live in Ghana and are wellinformed about the functioning of public organizations. The knowledgeables included officials in government agencies, bilateral and multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, research organizations and the private sector. Third, the knowlegeables were asked to rank the 47 organizations on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 for poor performer; 5 for best performer) based on their capacity to perform the major tasks for achieving their main functions. 8 Fourth, data from the survey of knowledgeables were tabulated and the mean score for each organization determined. The 13 top-ranked organizations were labeled as good performers and the 13 bottom-ranked organizations were labeled as poor performers, and the 26 organizations were selected for the next phase of the study. Of these 26 organizations, a total of 19 (9 good performers and 10 poor performers) participated in the study (see Table 1 ).
[Insert Table 1 here]
A total of 223 employees from the 19 institutions were interviewed-130 of the respondents were from well-performing organizations and 93 were from poor performing institutions. Table 2 presents the background characteristics of the respondents.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Description of the Variables
The factors that affect performance of the public sector can be broadly classified into two: rendered, as well as discretionary payments other than direct wages or salaries that workers get from their jobs. We consider remuneration as an external factor because in Ghana, salaries of public organizations are determined by the government. Kiltgaard (1997) and Grindle (1997) argue that there is a positive relationship between remuneration and public sector performance. If this is true, then salaries should be higher in good performing organizations.
Specificity of Tasks:
Refers to the consistency of instructions and policies that come from the government to the individual organizations. Consistent instructions and policies promote good performance (Israel, 1987) . This suggests that the specificity of tasks is more consistent for good performing organizations than poorly performing ones.
Political Interference:
Refers to the political context in which organizations operate; including the extent to which organizations are politically autonomous and operate free from constant and particular direction from politicians (Wolf, 1993) . Excessive political interference in the activities of public organizations in Africa has been blamed for the poor performance of the public sector (Sandbrook, 1993) . 9 See Owusu, (2004) for a detailed discussion of the methods and the analysis of the factors.
Client Demand and Oversight:
This is a measure of the effectiveness of civil society in demanding high performance from public agencies. The extent to which citizens are seen as customers of public organizations and the extent to which organizations are accountable to citizens have been shown to influence employee attitudes toward work (Grindle, 1997; Deininger and Mpuga, 2004) .
Internal Factors
1. Organizational Mission: This refers to the general social contribution and purpose of the agency and its related general goals (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999) . Useful missions are established interactively by the external stakeholders and members of the organization and broadly shared and internalized by employees (Grindle, 1997) .
Recruitment Criteria:
Organizations that hire employees based on their qualifications are more likely to be productive than those that hire based on personal connections. With this in mind, we examine whether there are significant differences in the importance of personal connections in the hiring of employees in good and bad performing organizations.
Performance Expectation and Evaluations:
Performance expectation refers to the degree to which employees are given clear signals about how diligently they should work and about the quality of work expected of them (Grindle, 1997) , and performance evaluation refers to the degree to which employees know and understand, on a continuous basis, how effectively they are performing (Hackman and Oldman, 1975) . Organizations that have clear and consistent policies about performance expectations and evaluation procedures would be expected to perform better.
4. Employee Sanctioning: Involves reprimanding employees who perform below expectations and disregard the organization's rules and regulations. A sanctioning system that is based on transparent, fair and unbiased criteria could discourage such practices. Thus, good performing organizations will have better sanctioning system than poor performing organizations.
5.
Autonomy: Is the degree to which employees are offered the freedom, independence and discretion to make decisions pertaining to the substantive and procedural aspects of their jobs, such as scheduling and determining the procedure to be used in executing the task (Hackman and Oldham, 1975) . The impact of autonomy can be seen at different levels of an organization. For instance, autonomy from civil service rules and regulations may allow management to use creative ways to deal with the day-to-day problems of the organization. Similarly, employees would be less motivated if they had to refer every little decision to management. While complete lack of autonomy can stifle performance, too much autonomy also can have a negative effect by creating "extreme isolation from communication and exchange with external stakeholders" (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999:16) . The key to effective performance therefore is "responsive autonomy."
Results
The results are presented in Table 4 . Among the external factors, the only measure that showed significant differences between good and poor performers is the incentive system: remuneration is higher in good performing organizations than poor performing ones. For the other external measures, namely, client demand and oversight, specificity of task and political interference, we found no significant differences between the two types of organizations. With regards to the internal factors, only one measure, recruitment criteria, was significantly different among the two groups: employees in poor performing institutions were more often hired based on personal (family and/or political) connections.
None of the other internal factors considered was significant in distinguishing between the types of organizations.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions
This study has empirically analyzed the differences between good and poor performing public organizations in Ghana. The data shows that good performing organizations are different in two respects:
remuneration and hiring criteria. Specifically, we show that good performing organizations pay higher salaries. Furthermore, poor performing organizations are more likely to hire employees based on their personal connections. We argue that to the extent that the characteristics of an organization determine the organization's performance, our results suggest that the differential performance of the two types of institutions may be partly attributed to differences in salaries and hiring criteria. In Ghana, salaries in the public sector are determined by the government. Thus, our analysis suggest that in order to improve performance in poor performing organizations, both the government and management must play important roles: the government needs to boost salaries in poor performing organizations and the management of these organizations should employ open and competitive recruitment procedures.
We end by noting some caveats. The limited size of the sample of organizations and employees who participated in the study and problems associated with the use of the reputational method for classifying organizations into good and poor performers must be taken into consideration when applying the results. This study must be seen as a first step in documenting the experiences of good and poor performing organizations in Ghana and other African countries. The work may be expanded to include more public organizations in Ghana, increase the number of respondents, and extended to cover other African countries. 
